FIU Law Review
Volume 16
Number 1 Symposium on the COVID Care Crisis
and its Implications for Legal Academia
(Bloomington, Indiana, 2021)

Article 15

2022

Section 230 is Not Broken: Why Most Proposed Section 230
Reforms Will Do More Harm Than Good, and How the Ninth
Circuit Got it Right
Christian Sarceño Robles
FIU College of Law, Csarceno@fiu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Internet Law Commons

Online ISSN: 2643-7759
Recommended Citation
Christian Sarceño Robles, Section 230 is Not Broken: Why Most Proposed Section 230 Reforms Will Do
More Harm Than Good, and How the Ninth Circuit Got it Right, 16 FIU L. Rev. 213 (2021).
DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.25148/lawrev.16.1.15

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by eCollections. It has been accepted for inclusion in FIU
Law Review by an authorized editor of eCollections. For more information, please contact lisdavis@fiu.edu.

11 - SARCENO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2/17/22 10:44 AM

SECTION 230 IS NOT BROKEN: WHY MOST PROPOSED
SECTION 230 REFORMS WILL DO MORE HARM THAN
GOOD, AND HOW THE NINTH CIRCUIT GOT IT RIGHT
Christian Sarceño Robles
I.
II.

 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 213
 BACKGROUND ............................................................................ 214
A. Section 230’s Text ................................................................... 215
B. How Courts Have Interpreted Section 230 .............................. 217
C. Recent Criticisms Surrounding Section 230 ............................ 219
III.  ANALYSIS ..................................................................................... 220
A. Proposals Aimed at Curbing Perceived Political Censorship .. 220
B. Proposals Advocating Carveouts for Certain “Heinous”
Crimes ...................................................................................... 222
C. Proposals Seeking to Condition Immunity on “Reasonable”
Moderation Practices ............................................................... 224
D. Proposals Advocating Carveouts for Platforms with Actual
Knowledge or Notice that the Third-Party Content at Issue Was
Illegal ....................................................................................... 227
E. Proposals for a Purposive Approach that Leaves Out Bad
Samaritans: How the Ninth Circuit Got Section 230 Right ..... 228
IV.  CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 230

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1996, Congress enacted 47 U.S.C. § 230 (“Section 230”) as part of the
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), essentially protecting online
services from any liability for content produced by third parties.1 With the
hope to encourage internet service providers (“ISPs”) to moderate the content
on their platforms so that minors would be less often exposed to indecent
material online, the CDA authorized ISPs and users of interactive computer
services to restrict access to inappropriate materials without risking liability
from being classified as publishers.2 Section 230 quickly grew to become so
1
2

47 U.S.C.S. § 230 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 117-36).

H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 81–91 (1996); S. REP. NO. 104-230, at 187–93 (1996); S. REP. NO.
104-23, at 9 (1995) (all noting statutory purpose of protecting minors from exposure to online
pornographic materials).
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central to US internet law that it has been cited as one of the “most important
laws supporting the internet, e-commerce and the online economy” and also
“the most important law protecting internet speech.”3 The legal scholar Jeff
Kosseff more concisely described it as “the twenty-six words that created the
internet.”4 Although traditionally hailed as one of the most important
governmental actions for the development of the internet, the idea of
reforming Section 230 has now been increasingly gathering support from
government officials. Lately, many politicians on both sides of the aisle have
argued that the CDA has been stretched far beyond its original intent and
have criticized Section 230 for the role it has allegedly played in “protecting
purveyors of hate speech, revenge porn, defamation, disinformation, and
other objectionable content.”5 This comment will address why these latest
efforts to reform Section 230 are fundamentally misguided by: (1) analyzing
the history and some of the most relevant court decisions surrounding Section
230; (2) summarizing some of the most common elements in proposed
Section 230 reform, discussing its policy goals, and arguing that such reforms
would either run contrary to the purpose of Section 230, be largely ineffective
in achieving their policy goals, or have major economic and free speech
consequences that would outweigh any of their potential benefits; and (3)
proposing that the best balance between the interests of consumers and
interactive computer services is served by courts following the legal
framework already articulated by the Ninth Circuit, whereby Section 230
immunity is conditioned on a website not encouraging illegal content or
requiring users to input illegal content in its design.
II. BACKGROUND
Before Section 230 was enacted, two landmark court cases addressed
ISP third-party liability: Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co.6 and
Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc.7 Whereas the court in Prodigy found
Prodigy, an online operator of bulletin boards and forums, liable for a
subscriber’s defamatory message board posts because Prodigy regularly took
3 Jeffrey Neuburger, The Communication Decency Act and the DOJ’s Proposed Solution: No Easy
Answers, PROSKAUER (June 19, 2020), https://newmedialaw.proskauer.com/2020/06/19/thecommunication-decency-act-and-the-dojs-proposed-solution-no-easy-answers/; CDA 230: The Most
Important
Law
Protecting
Internet
Speech,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230.
4

JEFF KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET (Cornell Univ. Press

2019).
5

Neuburger, supra note 3.

6

See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. May 24, 1995).
7

See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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steps to remove objectionable content,8 the court in CompuServe dismissed
the case because CompuServe, although similarly an operator of online
forums, did not screen any of the content uploaded to its servers and could
not be liable for defamatory content it did not know of or had reason to know
of.9 Prodigy, a “publisher” due to its efforts to screen content, was liable,10
but CompuServe, a mere “distributor” of online content, was not.11 This
created what is known as the moderator’s dilemma, wherein socially
responsible online intermediaries would be faced with the tough choice
between screening content—potentially facing liability—or taking a handsoff approach.12 Congress, having expected online platforms to screen out
objectionable content (such as pornography easily viewable by children), was
troubled by the deterrence to internet moderation promulgated by these
judicial rulings and sought to rectify it through legislative action.13 It stood
to reason that platforms who endeavored to remove objectionable content,
even if they did the job imperfectly, should not be exposed to potentially
business-ending legal action any more than those that refuse to undertake
these socially valuable moderating practices.14 Congress eventually enacted
Section 230 of the CDA as its proposed solution.15 Since then, Congress,
through legislation, and the courts, by interpreting its scope, have continued
to shape the contours of Section 230.
A. Section 230’s Text
Section 230(c) of the CDA, entitled “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’
blocking and screening of offensive material,” is divided in two key
provisions.16 The first, Section 230(c)(1), specifies that providers or users of
interactive computer services will not “be treated as the publisher or speaker
of any information provided by another information content provider.”17 This
provision immunizes platforms when it comes to user generated content and
seeks to shield defendants such as the one in Prodigy from publisher or

8

Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *5.

9

Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 139–40.

10

Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *4.

11

Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 144.

12

Eric Goldman, An Overview of the United States’ Section 230 Internet Immunity, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF ONLINE INTERMEDIARY LIAB. 155, 157 (Giancarlo Frosio ed., 2018).
13

Id. at 157–58.

14

Id.

15

47 U.S.C.S. § 230 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 117-36).

16

47 U.S.C.S. § 230(c) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 117-36).

17

47 U.S.C.S. § 230(c)(1) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 117-36).
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speaker based liability.18 In other words, after Section 230(c)(1) was enacted,
if a user of any social media app, review site, online marketplace, blog,
forum, or any other “interactive computer service” posts something for which
that user may be liable, liability ends with that user and does not extend to a
platform simply for hosting that user’s speech.19
The second provision, Section 230(c)(2), states that online service
providers should not be held liable for good-faith filtering or blocking of user
generated content.20 Section 230(c)(2) allows platforms to moderate user
generated content without exposing themselves to liability for doing so.21 By
removing the potentially business-ending financial risk known as civil
liability, this provision sought to encourage ISPs to moderate content rather
than remain passive observers like CompuServe.22
Taking both provisions together, Section 230 created an internet where
online platforms are not liable for user generated content but remain free to
moderate as much or as little of that content without exposing themselves to
liability. Section 230 recognizes that while it is impractical to require that
platforms moderate all user generated content, it is desirable for platforms to
moderate objectionable content to the best of their ability; as such, Section
230 states that they will not be punished (through exposure to liability) if they
choose to moderate user content, even if their efforts are lukewarm.23
Section 230 does also carve out limitations for its immunity
provisions.24 For example, Section 230 specifically states it has no effect on
federal criminal law, intellectual property law, and the Electronic Privacy
Communications Act.25 In 2018, Congress amended Section 230’s safe
harbor provisions to also include a carveout for the knowing facilitation of
sex trafficking in what became known as the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers
Act and Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act
(FOSTA-SESTA).26 FOSTA-SESTA was enacted at least in part as a
response to Backpage.com, which was a website that tried to maximize its
18 See generally Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
19

47 U.S.C.S. § 230(c)(1) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 117-36).

20

47 U.S.C.S. § 230(c)(2) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 117-36).

21

Id.

22

See generally Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).

23

Gus Hurwitz, The Third Circuit’s Oberdorf v. Amazon Opinion Offers a Good Approach to
Reining in the Worst Abuses of Section 230, TRUTH ON THE MKT. (July 15, 2019),
https://truthonthemarket.com/2019/07/15/the-third-circuits-oberdorf-v-amazon-opinion-offers-a-goodapproach-to-reining-in-the-worst-abuses-of-section-230/.
24

47 U.S.C.S. § 230(e) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 117-36).

25

Id.

26

See 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 1591, 1595, 2421A (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 117-36) [hereinafter
FOSTA-SESTA].
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profits from online commercial sex advertising, some of which advertised
victims of sex trafficking.27 The First Circuit Court of Appeals had held that
Backpage.com was immunized by Section 230(c)(1), prompting the
legislative action.28
B. How Courts Have Interpreted Section 230
After Congress enacted Section 230, the ball was thrown back to the
courts to determine how broadly to interpret its scope. Zeran v. AOL quickly
became the leading Section 230 opinion, holding that Section 230 granted
ISPs protection from liability based on third-party content even when notice
was given to the ISP of the illegality.29 Activities that would ordinarily dictate
a publisher’s liability in the offline world, such as editing or filtering of
content, would no longer trigger liability in the online world.30
However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in its decision in Fair
Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, later tried
to carve an exception to the Zeran ruling.31 The opinion stated that “[i]f you
don’t encourage illegal content, or design your website to require users to
input illegal content, you will be immune.”32 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit
decided to limit Section 230 protections to illegal conduct that is merely
incidental to the functions of the online platform, and not part of its design or
goals.33 In other words, the Ninth Circuit decided on a more purposive
approach. Interactive computer services that “passively display content that
is created entirely by third parties” were held to be different from those that
are “‘responsible, in whole or in part’” for the illegal conduct.34 The court
concluded that it is only the former that Section 230 immunizes.35 A website
that induces a user to commit an illegal act would not be immune from

27 See Eric Goldman, The Complicated Story of FOSTA and Section 230, 17 FIRST AMEND. L.
REV. 279, 280–82 (2019).
28

Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 23 (1st Cir. 2016).

29

See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997).

30

Eric Goldman, The Ten Most Important Section 230 Rulings, 20 TUL. J. TECH & INTELL. PROP.
1, 3 (2017).
31 See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1175
(9th Cir. 2008).
32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Id. at 1163.

35

Id. at 1172–73.
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liability.36 Some courts, but not all,37 have followed the lead of the Ninth
Circuit and also found an exception to the liability shield afforded to websites
by Section 230 in cases where the defendant induces the illegality, and have
declined to extend protections to these so-called “bad Samaritans.”38 The
Tenth Circuit, for example, seemed to embrace this line of reasoning when it
held in FTC v. Accusearch, Inc. that “a service provider is ‘responsible’ for
the development of offensive content only if it in some way specifically
encourages development of what is offensive about the content.”39 The First
Circuit, however, stated that “a website operator’s decisions in structuring its
website and posting requirements are publisher functions entitled to section
230(c)(1) protection” in one of the infamous cases against Backpage.com that
prompted congressional action in the form of FOSTA-SESTA.40 The First
Circuit’s rationale comes in apparent conflict with the Ninth Circuit as the
courts reached opposite conclusions when it comes to whether website design
decisions are immunized by Section 230.41
Courts have continued to define the contours of Section 230 in many
other landmark decisions over the years. The holding in Doe v. MySpace,
Inc., for example, illustrates how internet platforms are not liable for issues
that occur offline following some online action.42 In that case, a young girl
was sexually assaulted by a man she met online and eventually agreed to
meet.43 The court held that MySpace, which provided the communication
tools between the two individuals, was precluded from liability because of
Section 230.44 Similarly, cases against social media service providers
alleging material support to terrorists after allowing the terrorists to
disseminate content on their platforms have been dismissed on Section 230
grounds.45

36

Id. at 1175.

37

See, e.g., Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 22 (1st Cir. 2016); Jones v. Dirty World
Ent. Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 413–14 (6th Cir. 2014). But see Fed. Trade Comm’n v. LeadClick
Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2016).
38

See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2009).

39

Id.

40

Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d at 22.

41

Compare Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d at 22, with Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley
v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008).
42

Goldman, supra note 30, at 4–5.

43

Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 416 (5th Cir. 2008).

44

Id. at 422.

45

See, e.g., Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., F. Supp. 3d 140, 145 (E.D.N.Y. 2017); Fields v. Twitter,
Inc., 200 F. Supp. 3d 964, 971–72 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
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C. Recent Criticisms Surrounding Section 230
In the past few years, Section 230 has been the subject of much debate,
and lawmakers from both major parties have submitted various proposals for
reforms in Congress,46 some of which have passed both chambers in a
bipartisan manner, such as FOSTA-SESTA.47 At the time when FCC
Chairman Ajit Pai tried to move forward with rulemaking to interpret Section
230 (an endeavor which he quickly gave up on48), he noted that “‘[m]embers
of all three branches of government have expressed serious concern about the
prevailing interpretation of Section 230.’”49 Even the Department of Justice
submitted a twenty-eight-page outline during the Trump Administration
outlining several proposals of its own,50 and President Donald Trump himself
signed an executive order dealing with the subject.51 President Trump went
as far as to veto the National Defense Authorization Act in late 2020 because
it did not include language to repeal Section 230, although this veto was later
overridden by Congress in a bipartisan vote.52 Similarly, President Joe Biden
has called for Section 230 to be “revoked, immediately.”53 In the current
political climate, there is a growing call to amend or even repeal the
protections afforded to ISPs by Section 230,54 even if the policy justifications
for doing so remain very diverse across the political spectrum.55

46 See Zoe Bedell & John Major, What’s Next for Section 230? A Roundup of Proposals,
LAWFARE (July 29, 2020, 9:01 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/whats-next-section-230-roundupproposals.
47

See FOSTA-SESTA, supra note 26.

48

Sean Hollister, FCC Chairman Ajit Pai Gave Up on His Legally Dicey Attempt to ‘Clarify’
Internet Law, THE VEERGE (Jan. 7, 2021, 8:42 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2021/1/7/22219677/fccajit-pai-section-230-its-over.
49 Thomas Johnson Jr., The FCC’s Authority to Interpret Section 230 of the Communications Act,
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N (Oct. 21, 2020, 10:30 AM), https://www.fcc.gov/newsevents/blog/2020/10/21/fccs-authority-interpret-section-230-communications-act.
50 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SECTION 230 — NURTURING INNOVATION OR FOSTERING
UNACCOUNTABILITY? 1 (2020), https://www.justice.gov/file/1286331/download.
51

Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (June 2, 2020).

52

Matthew Daly, In a First, Congress Overrides Trump Veto of Defense Bill, THE ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Jan. 1, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-donald-trump-defense-policy-bills85656704ad9ae1f9cf202ee76d7a14fd.
53 Makena Kelly, Joe Biden Wants to Revoke Section 230, THE VERGE (Jan. 17, 2020, 10:29 AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/1/17/21070403/joe-biden-president-election-section-230communications-decency-act-revoke.
54 See, e.g., Danielle K. Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad
Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 404 (2017); Zoe Bedell & John Major, What’s
Next for Section 230? A Roundup of Proposals, LAWFARE (July 29, 2020, 9:01 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/whats-next-section-230-roundup-proposals.
55

See Bedell & Major, supra note 54.
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III. ANALYSIS
The most prominent Section 230 reform proposals fall under one of the
following categories: (1) those aimed at curbing perceived political
censorship,56 (2) those advocating carveouts for certain “heinous” crimes
(such as sex trafficking, child abuse, and terrorism),57 (3) those seeking to
condition immunity on “reasonable” moderation practices,58 (4) those
advocating carveouts for platforms with actual knowledge or notice that the
third-party content at issue was illegal,59 or (5) those seeking to make explicit
that Section 230 does not protect so-called “Bad Samaritans.”60
A. Proposals Aimed at Curbing Perceived Political
Censorship
These types of proposals garnered vast Republican support during
Trump’s presidency, and President Trump’s own executive order, though
largely symbolic, is perhaps the best example.61 The executive order stated
that Section 230
immunity should not . . . provide protection for those who
purport to provide users a forum for free and open speech,
but in reality use their power over a vital means of
communication to engage in deceptive or pretextual actions
stifling free and open debate by censoring certain
viewpoints.62
These proposals usually target what many Republican politicians
perceive as anti-conservative bias of major online platforms, and focus on
removing immunity for those platforms who engage in political censorship.63
Senator Ted Cruz, for example, argued: “[B]ig tech enjoys an immunity from
liability on the assumption they would be neutral and fair. If they’re not going
to be neutral and fair, if they’re going to be biased, we should repeal the
immunity from liability so they should be liable like the rest of us.”64
56

See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (June 2, 2020).

57

See, e.g., FOSTA-SESTA, supra note 26.

58

See, e.g., Citron & Wittes, supra note 54, at 403.

59

See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 50, at 3.

60

Id.

61

See Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (June 2, 2020).

62

Id.

63

Bedell & Major, supra note 46.

64

Danielle K. Citron & Mary A. Franks, The Internet as a Speech Machine and Other Myths
Confounding Section 230 Reform, 2020 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 45, 62 (2020).
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The idea is that tech companies should receive Section 230 immunity
only if they refrain from viewpoint discrimination, which is reminiscent of
First Amendment constitutional requirements.65 The proposals liken the
times when a platforms removes, blocks, or mutes user generated content
based on political beliefs to prohibited state actor censorship under the First
Amendment that should deprive the platform of its Section 230 immunity.66
One example of these proposals is Senator Josh Hawley’s proposal, which
would require internet platforms to pass a political neutrality audit from the
Federal Trade Commission to obtain Section 230 protections,67 and another
is U.S. Representative Louie Gohmert’s proposal, which would require
platforms to sort user generated content in chronological order rather than
moderating content’s prominence and visibility based on their own criteria.68
Leaving aside whether political bias in online platforms is as prevalent
or problematic as proponents of political neutrality reforms to Section 230
claim, a thorough reading of Section 230 or its legislative history simply does
not suggest that political neutrality had anything to do with the law.69 Section
230 was intended “to remove disincentives for the development and
utilization of blocking and filtering technologies.”70 As such, Section 230
was meant to promote, not dissuade, the use of censors, such that websites
could filter objectionable content without triggering liability. Furthermore,
parallels between the social media platforms and public forums or other such
attempts to tie Section 230 and the First Amendment are disingenuous or at
least inaccurate. First Amendment obligations fall entirely on government
actors, not private actors.71 The First Amendment protects, not prohibits, the
rights of private actors against compelled speech.72 If there are any First
Amendment factors to be considered in website filtering or blocking of user
generated content, they would be in favor, not against, the rights of private
actors to decide which content they wish to promote.73 It is therefore no
surprise that Florida’s Stop Social Media Censoring Act, which would have
fined social media platforms for banning some political candidates, and was
largely a legislative response to Trump’s Twitter ban, was blocked by a

65

Id. at 61.

66

Id.

67

Senator Hawley Introduces Legislation to Amend Section 230 Immunity for Big Tech
Companies, JOSH HAWLEY (June 19, 2019), https://www.hawley.senate.gov/senator-hawley-introduceslegislation-amend-section-230-immunity-big-tech-companies.
68

Citron & Franks, supra note 64, at 63.

69

Id. at 62.

70

47 U.S.C.S. § 230(b)(4) (LexisNexis 2021).

71

Citron & Franks, supra note 64.

72

Id.

73

Id.

11 - SARCENO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

222

2/17/22 10:44 AM

FIU Law Review

[Vol. 16:213

federal judge before it could take effect, partially due to First Amendment
issues.74At least inasmuch as it concerns Section 230’s original policy goals,
political neutrality was not and should not be relevant.
B. Proposals Advocating Carveouts for Certain “Heinous”
Crimes
Proposals advocating carveouts for certain “heinous” crimes focus on
particular categories of objectionable content, such as sex trafficking, child
abuse, or terrorism, and either remove Section 230 immunity for such content
or incentivize more aggressive efforts to police it.75 FOSTA-SESTA is the
best example of this type of proposal, and also highlights many of the
problems these proposals would likely also encounter.76 For example, within
days of FOSTA-SESTA’s passage, Craigslist felt forced to take down its
personals section, judging that it could not take the risk of liability due to the
actions of third parties in that section without jeopardizing its other
services.77 As the Center for Democracy and Technology stated:
Without limits on liability for hosting user speech, such
intermediaries are likely to react by significantly limiting
what their users can say‚ including a potentially wide range
of lawful speech, from discussions on dating forums about
consensual adult sex, to resources for promoting safety
among sex workers. Indeed . . . that has already started to
happen, with platforms restricting access to information that
promotes public health and safety, political discourse, and
economic growth.78
Reddit, Techdirt.com, and Engine Advocacy also collectively filed an
amicus brief discussing the burden FOSTA-SESTA imposes on websites that
host user comments.79 In the brief, Reddit claimed it felt the need to eliminate

74 NetChoice, LLC v. Moody, No. 4:21cv220-RH-MAF, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121951, at *4,
*19, *33 (N.D. Fla. June 30, 2021).
75

Bedell & Major, supra note 46.

76

See FOSTA-SESTA, supra note 26.

77

Karen Gullo & David Greene, With FOSTA Already Leading to Censorship, Plaintiffs Are
Seeking Reinstatement of Their Lawsuit Challenging the Law’s Constitutionality, EFF (Mar. 1, 2019),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/02/fosta-already-leading-censorship-we-are-seeking-reinstatementour-lawsuit.
78 Corrected Brief of Amicus Curiae Center for Democracy & Technology in Support of PlaintiffsAppellants at 26, Woodhull Freedom Found. v. United States, 948 F.3d 363 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (No. 185298),
https://www.eff.org/document/orrected-brief-amicus-curiae-center-democracy-technologysupport-plaintiffs-appellants.
79

Gullo & Greene, supra note 77.
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a forum about harm reduction and safety for sex workers to shelter itself from
potential future liability after the passage of FOSTA-SESTA.80 Regrettably,
doing so may have increased the actual threat to sex workers that FOSTASESTA was enacted to reduce. Reddit argued: “[b]roadly written rules almost
necessarily result in lawful content being removed because there is no way
for Reddit to weigh all the voluminous expression it reviews in a sufficiently
nuanced and contextualized way to eliminate the risk of content targeted by
FOSTA slipping through.”81
Before President Trump signed FOSTA-SESTA, Backpage, the website
that started it all, was already gone and its CEO was already convicted, victim
restitution was guaranteed, and multiple courts had held that Section 230 did
not prevent victims’ civil claims from going forward.82 In other words, the
problem FOSTA-SESTA was designed to solve was already nonexistent by
the time it became law. And yet, as a result of Congress enacting FOSTASESTA anyway, as Professor Eric Goldman put it, “the internet shrank.”83
By attaching Section 230 immunity to an internet platform’s lack of
knowledge of sex trafficking, FOSTA-SESTA revives the dilemma that led
Congress to pass Section 230 in the first place.84 To shield themselves from
liability, some online platforms have wavered between filtering everything
even remotely related to sex or figuratively covering their eyes and ears by
turning off all moderation so that they cannot be held responsible for
“knowingly facilitat[ing] sex trafficking.”85 Others, like Craigslist, simply
have exited or turned off that part of their operations.86
As seen by the successful passage of FOSTA-SESTA, carveouts can
easily earn bipartisan favor.87 It is therefore no surprise that proposals
centering around carveouts have become increasingly numerous.88 In June
2020, for example, the Department of Justice released a report identifying
areas for Section 230 reform, and among their proposals were carveouts for
terrorism, child sex abuse, and cyber stalking.89 Others have suggested
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Brief of Amici Curiae Floor64, Inc. d/b/a The Copia Institute, Engine Advocacy & Reddit, Inc.
in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 17, Woodhull Freedom Found. v. United States, 948 F.3d 363 (D.C.
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carveouts for crimes such as drug trafficking90 and hate speech.91 These
crimes are often those that would easily shock the conscience, leading to their
bipartisan approval. However, the truth is that there is little that could
objectively differentiate these crimes from any others in relation to Section
230’s policy goals. The idea of a carveout approach to Section 230 “is
inevitably underinclusive, establishing a normative hierarchy of harms that
leaves other harmful conduct to be addressed another day.”92 As horrible as
sex trafficking and other similarly egregious crimes may be, it is unlikely that
these reforms will help victims, and some argue it might actually hurt them.93
For example, Professor Eric Goldman argued that FOSTA-SESTA’s
enactment “pushed sex workers back to the streets, where they once again
become subject to the dominion of pimps, and where they lose some of the
physical safety protections they had gained through online negotiations.”94
Furthermore, by establishing this hierarchy, the crimes that are not carved out
are in essence treated as less important than the others or as not worth
removing the legal shield for. The message this might send to victims of these
other crimes that are not carved out, but who nonetheless feel wronged by
criminal behavior on the internet, cannot be said to be a positive one. An
approach that creates carveouts for “heinous” crimes would not only be
counterintuitive, but it would require Section 230 to be regularly and
unrealistically updated by Congress as it reacts to the ever-changing values
of modern society.95
C. Proposals Seeking to Condition Immunity on
“Reasonable” Moderation Practices
This approach, originally proposed by Danielle Citron and Lawfare
editor-in-chief Benjamin Wittes, would carve out from Section 230
defendants who fail to take “reasonable steps to prevent or address unlawful
uses of their services.”96 This proposal has the stated aim of “eliminat[ing]
the immunity for the worst actors,” so-called “Bad Samaritans,” who were
debatably not envisioned to be covered by the immunity provided in Section

90 Samantha Cole, Senator Suggests the Internet Needs a FOSTA/SESTA for Drug Trafficking,
VICE (Sept. 5, 2018, 2:47 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/8xbwvp/joe-manchin-fostasesta-law-for-drug-trafficking-senate-intelligence-committee-hearing.
91 Ron Wyden, The Consequences of Indecency, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 23, 2018, 2:15 PM),
https://techcrunch.com/2018/08/23/the-consequences-of-indecency/.
92

Citron & Franks, supra note 64, at 69.
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See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 27, at 289–92.
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Id. at 291–92.
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See Citron & Wittes, supra note 54, at 419.
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230.97 Other than a full repeal of Section 230, it is perhaps the most sweeping
and burdensome of all proposals,98 and it would likely require “expensive and
lengthy factual inquiries into all evidence probative of the reasonableness”
of the internet platform’s behavior.99 Unlike targeted proposals, an acrossthe-board reasonableness requirement would have far-reaching
consequences. It would immediately deprive businesses of Section 230’s
biggest procedural benefits, as more cases would have to go to trial for factual
determinations rather than be dismissed, increasing the costs of the
litigation.100 These procedural losses will lead to the elimination or exit of
internet services, much like what occurred after FOSTA-SESTA, but on a
much wider scale because of its more sweeping nature.101
Furthermore, a “reasonable steps” inquiry is vague and will likely
remain unpredictable for businesses. This will result in businesses either
under-moderating, if they believe erroneously that their moderation practices
are reasonable enough when they are not—facing unexpected and possibly
enormous financial liability—or over-moderating due to cautiousness,
resulting in more collateral censorship, as internet services remove legitimate
borderline content out of fear that a judge might otherwise hold their practices
unreasonable.102 Reasonableness itself is an amorphous term that is likely to
develop and evolve over time as technologies and public attitudes change,
resulting in businesses who are left behind by their peers to suddenly face
liability where they were once deemed to have acted reasonably.
Finally, a “reasonable steps” condition before immunity is granted
would run contrary to the objective of Section 230 to encourage internet
moderation.103 A reasonable standard would not only catch “Bad
Samaritans”, but it would also catch those that are negligent in their services.
Leaving aside whether the law should protect those that negligently allow
illegal conduct to thrive in their website, if taking reasonable steps is too
burdensome for an internet platform and it does not want to close its business,
it is once again faced with the moderator’s dilemma that prompted Congress
to take action in the first place.104 After all, CompuServe shows us that even
before Section 230, an effective way to avoid liability was just to take a
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Id. at 409, 419.
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See Eric Goldman, Why Section 230 Is Better Than the First Amendment, 95 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. ONLINE at *45 (2019).
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See 47 U.S.C.S. § 230(b)(4) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 117-36).
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Compare Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), with Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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completely hands-off approach to moderation.105 Other courts have found
CompuServe to have established persuasive precedent in this area, at least
inasmuch as it concerns defamation.106 There is little reason to believe that
courts will decide cases any differently after such an amendment, as liability
for internet platforms that take this hands-off approach (and therefore have
no reason to know of any illegal material) was not prevalent even before
Section 230.107 Even in the offline world where Section 230 does not apply,
courts have found book publishers, for example, not liable for defamatory
statements if they did not engage in any substantive editing or writing of the
book.108 As UNC law professor David S. Ardia wrote, “[m]any of the
intermediaries that invoked section 230 likely would not have faced liability
under the common law because they lacked knowledge of and editorial
control over the third-party content at issue in the cases.”109
By erasing Section 230’s procedural benefits, the disincentive to
moderating that sparked Section 230’s passage in the first place simply
returns along with the rising litigation costs, and this reformed Section 230
will therefore fail to meet its policy goals.110 Rather than engage in some
content moderation, which if insufficient may be seen as negligent by a court
and result in financial liability, it would be safer from the point of view of the
internet platform to leave every internet user to fend for themselves and hope
that courts will find that the passive nature of their business practice absolves
them from liability. A reasonable standard that erases Section 230’s
procedural benefits would make Section 230 almost entirely pointless and
would needlessly punish platforms for engaging in content moderation when
they fail to meet this reasonableness standard. Putting on an internet blindfold
is a tried-and-true method of avoiding liability exposure that is likely to
persuade at least some businesses to rethink their online moderation
practices. Rather than encourage this, it is better to incentivize platforms to
do some content moderation—even if they do so poorly or do not devote
enough resources to it—by offering Section 230’s legal shield even when
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See generally Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 135.
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See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1367 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“[r]ecent decisions have held that where a BBS exercised little control over the
content of the material on its service, it was more like a ‘distributor’ than a ‘republisher’ and was thus
only liable for defamation on its system where it knew or should have known of the defamatory
statements”).
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Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 140–41.

108

See Sandler v. Calcagni, 565 F. Supp. 2d 184, 194 (D. Me. 2008) (holding that without proof
of scienter, book publisher was not liable for defamatory statements made by author).
109 David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of
Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L. REV. 373, 480
(2010).
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they are incompetent or unreasonable. Section 230 allows these platforms to
change their moderation policies over time as they learn what works and what
does not without worrying about the meaning of abstract concepts like
reasonableness and the potential or real litigation costs that come alongside
a reasonableness standard.
D. Proposals Advocating Carveouts for Platforms with
Actual Knowledge or Notice that the Third-Party Content
at Issue Was Illegal
Proponents of this type of proposal argue that platforms who have actual
knowledge of illegal third-party content, or have reason to have such
knowledge, have a duty to remove said content and should be liable if they
choose inaction. The California Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal reached the
conclusion advocated by this proposal, but the result was short-lived as the
court’s holding was quickly overturned by the California Supreme Court in
Barrett v. Rosenthal.111 Various internet entities such as Google, Amazon,
and eBay argued that the California Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal’s
interpretation of Section 230 would lead to an internet where platforms
remove any content upon receiving a defamation notice, choosing not to
waste resources for inquiring into the notice’s validity or credibility, all so as
to easily circumvent any possible liability.112 This, they argue, would
seriously chill internet speech.113 The California Supreme Court agreed when
it decided Rosenthal,114 and the Zeran court similarly stated that “[L]iability
upon notice has a chilling effect on the freedom of internet speech” because
“service providers would be subject to liability only for the publication of
information, and not for its removal, they would have a natural incentive
simply to remove messages upon notification.”115 Because notice liability
encourages service providers to remove content first and ask questions later,
implementing notice liability could also lead to abuses from malicious
internet users who send defamation notices to silence legitimate voices, such
as victims of sexual assault.
The internet, as voluminous a space as it is, is riddled with information
and misinformation. While a notice-based liability system makes sense on a
smaller scale, verifying each and every one of the pieces of information given
111

Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 529 (Cal. 2006).
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See Brief of Amici Curiae Amazon.com, Inc. et al. at 63, Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510
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Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997).
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to internet platforms is not only burdensome and costly, but likely
impossible. This is even more so for smaller platforms who do not have the
resources to undergo projects of such scale. If any platforms were to survive,
it would likely be the biggest platforms who can afford the litigation and
business costs, especially after all their competition is reduced to a negligible
number of competitors. The California Supreme Court’s reversal in Barrett
v. Rosenthal “was meant to continue protection for free speech of ISPs and
individuals using online platforms to post non-author content, reduce online
intrusion of government regulation, interpret Congress’s intentions literally,
and prevent costs for ISPs to screen offensive material that would otherwise
increase if liability were opened.”116 For the same reasons that a notice-based
approach for Section 230 was not desirable when Rosenthal117 was decided,
it is not desirable now.
In order to ensure that internet platforms simply do not respond by
blinding themselves to the illegal content, this proposal often pairs Section
230 immunity with the requirement to design one’s internet service in a way
such that it can detect illegal activity.118 However, it is questionable whether
those who have an internet service design that is unable to detect illegal
activity would even need Section 230 immunity since benign internet
services which do not have any reason to know of the illegal conduct would
not likely be liable under the common law. This fact already puts into
question the effectiveness of this supposed incentive mechanism. That aside,
forcing platforms to monitor illegal activity in this manner would raise costs
further, putting an even bigger burden on smaller platforms with few
resources, even if effective.
E. Proposals for a Purposive Approach that Leaves Out Bad
Samaritans: How the Ninth Circuit Got Section 230 Right
As part of the Department of Justice’s proposals on Section 230 there is
a proposal that suggests codifying a “Bad Samaritan” carveout to Section
230, which would exempt from immunity those defendants who
“purposefully promote, solicit, or facilitate the posting of material that the
platform knew or had reason to believe would violate federal criminal
law.”119 The Department of Justice reasons that a company that “solicits third
parties to sell illegal drugs to minors, exchange[s] child sexual abuse

116 LYNNMA97, Barrett v. Rosenthal, FOUNDS. L. AND SOCIETY (Dec. 5, 2018),
https://foundationsoflawandsociety.wordpress.com/2018/12/05/barrett-v-rosenthal/.
117

See Rosenthal, 146 P.3d at 529 (Cal. 2006).
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material, or otherwise engage[s] in criminal activity on its service” should
not receive Section 230 protections.120 It sees an explicit “Bad Samaritan”
carveout as “necessary to ensure that bad actors do not benefit from Section
230’s sweeping immunity at the expense of their victims.”121
One important example of a case that would have been decided
differently had the proposal been adopted when the case was heard is Daniel
v. Armslist.122 In Armslist, a man murdered his wife and two other people
with an illegal firearm.123 However, the website that facilitated the sale was
found to be immune under Section 230.124 The court granted immunity
despite allegations that the website was designed specifically with the
purpose of providing users with a way to skirt federal firearm laws.125 Under
the Department of Justice’s proposal, plaintiffs would have likely been able
to show that the website purposefully promoted these illegal firearm sales,
which would have prevented Armslist from receiving Section 230
immunity.126
This approach is reminiscent of the Ninth Circuit’s Section 230
opinions, as well as that of those where other courts that have ruled
similarly.127 By attaching a “purposefully” mens rea, the Department of
Justice retains Section 230’s immunity for passive conduits of illegal conduct
but still punishes those, as the Ninth Circuit put it, that are “responsible, in
whole or in part” for the illegality.128 All of the examples the Department of
Justice stated in its report would likely already be found to not be protected
by Section 230 in the Ninth Circuit, either because they induce illegal
conduct or because the platform takes part in the illegality of the action.129
However, other courts with a broader interpretation of Section 230, such as
the court in Armslist, might have previously decided differently.130
Of course, in practice the line is not always so clear. When a website,
for example, recommends user-generated content to other users, such as
when YouTube recommends videos to their users or other websites highlight
“trending” content, they often do so through automated means that are not
necessarily meant to, but often can, encourage illegal content. Courts are
120
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likely to focus very deeply on the specific facts in each case to decide just
how far the illegal content being featured is a product of the website design
promoting illegal conduct in its structure and how far it is unintended.
It is important to note that had other circuits followed the holding of the
Ninth Circuit from the beginning, the Backpage131 case would likely have
been decided differently. Because Backpage.com was arguably designed in
such a way as to encourage illegal conduct, it would likely not have obtained
Section 230 immunity in the Ninth Circuit.132 With the opposite result from
Backpage, Congress would not have felt pressured to pass legislation such as
FOSTA-SESTA133 to reform Section 230, and many of the perceived ills of
Section 230 could have been ameliorated.
Effectively, this proposal maintains most of the status quo that has
worked to create the internet as we know it. Although new legislation would
not be needed if, say, the Supreme Court heard a Section 230 case to resolve
any perceived conflicts between circuit courts and ruled in favor of the Ninth
Circuit’s interpretation or even a similar rationale, reforms such as this one
could help expediate uniformity between courts before that happens. More
importantly, because all the proposal does is punish truly bad actors who
intentionally solicit or induce illegal conduct, unlike most other proposals, it
would not affect legitimate businesses. In fact, the biggest complaint that
others might have is that this proposal is likely to do a whole lot of nothing.
But as the old saying goes: if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.
IV. CONCLUSION
In 1996, U.S. Representatives Christopher Cox and Ron Wyden
suggested an amendment to the CDA that would encourage internet
moderation and promote internet decency.134 The House Rules Committee,
when it allowed consideration of this amendment, described that provision as
“protecting from liability those providers and users seeking to clean up the
internet.”135 This was the beginning of the twenty-six words that created the
internet, or at least the internet as we know it.136 Although Section 230 has
not been without its controversies, its impact in shaping the internet world is
undeniable.
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Critics claim Section 230 has taken a turn for the worse, and even Ron
Wyden, now a Senator, recently stated that it has become “increasingly
difficult for [him] to protect Section 230 in Congress” because of the failures
of internet CEOs to properly police content.137 The political tide is turning
further and further against Section 230, and new proposals of all kinds from
both sides of the political spectrum are being drafted.138 But these proposals
often fail to consider that Section 230 is not only a legal shield—it is an
incentive mechanism, and its protections are only a means to an end. When
proposals for Section 230 are made, the first question that proponents and
legislators should make to themselves is: How would these changes affect
the incentives for internet moderation? Regrettably, although many of the
reforms are in no doubt well-intentioned, often these proposals lose sight of
the legislative purpose Section 230 was enacted for in the first place. As
happened with FOSTA-SESTA, failure to consider Section 230 as the
incentive mechanism that it is can regrettably cause unexpected
consequences and actually do more harm than good.139 Similarly, although
Section 230 has in no doubt been a large vehicle in the promotion of free
speech, it is important to note that moderation was the goal of Section 230,
not an unintended side effect. Goals like political neutrality have little to do
with Section 230. Senator Wyden explained it well: “Section 230 is not about
neutrality. Period. Full stop.”140
When interpreting Section 230, courts should follow the lead of the
Ninth Circuit and ask whether the platform is a passive conduit or solicited,
induced, or contributed to the alleged illegality.141 For those platforms whose
goals are illegal, there is simply no reason, policy-wise, why Section 230
protections should be extended. After all, Section 230 of the CDA was not
meant to immunize “Bad Samaritans” whose business is the active
subversion of online decency.142 In fact, it is exactly the opposite.
Reforming Section 230, if done at all, should not go further than where
courts have already gone. Today, we have internet platforms that by and large
voluntarily undergo vast amounts of moderation in their services, not because
they must, but because they can. It is not as big of a financial burden because
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Section 230 exists. Without it, thousands of internet platforms would have to
rethink the economic calculi in those decisions. Today, we have a diverse and
open internet where people can generally choose from a variety of options
that suit their tastes, whether it be a kid-friendly website with very strict
moderation or perhaps one that takes a more laissez-faire approach and only
moderate the most egregious content. Many of the biggest internet players
agree on a lot of things while still disagreeing on some others, but we have
nonetheless achieved an internet balance where people can navigate the web
and find the type of internet services they desire with relative ease amongst
a myriad of options. If Section 230 reforms step out of bounds, they threaten
to destroy this balance. The extent to which the internet as we know it would
collapse would entirely depend on the scope of the reform, but there is little
doubt that, at the end of the day, the internet would have shrunk.

